Hofstra Law Review
Volume 41 | Issue 3

Article 4

2013

Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State PostConviction Proceedings After Martinez and
Pinholster
Eric M. Freedman
Maurice A. Deane School of Law at Hofstra University

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Freedman, Eric M. (2013) "Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-Conviction Proceedings After Martinez and
Pinholster," Hofstra Law Review: Vol. 41 : Iss. 3 , Article 4.
Available at: https://scholarlycommons.law.hofstra.edu/hlr/vol41/iss3/4

This document is brought to you for free and open access by Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Hofstra Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Scholarly Commons at Hofstra Law. For more information, please contact lawcls@hofstra.edu.

Freedman: Enforcing the ABA Guidelines in Capital State Post-Conviction Pro

ENFORCING THE ABA GUIDELINES IN CAPITAL
STATE POST-CONVICTION PROCEEDINGS AFTER
MAR TINEZ AND PINHOLSTER
Eric M Freedman*

I. INTRODUCTION: THE LONG ARC TOWARDS JUSTICE

The American Bar Association ("ABA") Guidelines for the
Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty
Cases' ("Guidelines") mandate "high quality legal representation in
accordance with these Guidelines" from the moment of arrest until the
prosecution is no longer entitled to seek the death penalty.2
Commentators have long urged the Supreme Court to translate this
sound policy--one that would benefit the states as well as prisoners 3 into an explicit rule of constitutional law requiring the states to provide
effective counsel in capital state post-conviction proceedings. 4

* Maurice A. Deane Distinguished Professor of Constitutional Law, Maurice A. Deane
School of Law, Hofstra University (Eric.M.Freedman@Hofstra.edu). B.A. 1975, Yale University;
M.A. 1977, Victoria University of Wellington (New Zealand); J.D. 1979, Yale University.
I serve as Reporter for the American Bar Association's Guidelines for the Appointment
and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases (rev. ed. 2003). The opinions
expressed herein, however, are mine alone. I have provided professional assistance to the defense
teams in a number of the cases cited in this Article.
This Article has benefitted from thoughtful input during its drafting by Ty Alper, Justin F.
Marceau, and Giovanna Shay.
1. ABA GUIDELINES FOR THE APPOINTMENT AND PERFORMANCE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN
DEATH PENALTY CASES, (rev. ed. 2003), in 31 HOFSTRA L. REv. 913 (2003) [hereinafter ABA
GUIDELINES].

2. See id. Guideline 1.1(B), at 919, Guideline 10.2, at 965.
3. See Eric M. Freedman, Fewer Risks, More Benefits: What Governments Gain by
Acknowledging the Right to Competent Counsel on State Post-Conviction Review in Capital Cases,
4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 183, 185-87 (2006) [hereinafter Freedman, Fewer Risks].
4. See, e.g., Eric M. Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow: The Right to Counsel in State
Capital Postconviction Proceedings, 91 CORNELL L. REv. 1079, 1099-1101 (2006) [hereinafter
Freedman, Giarratano Is a Scarecrow].
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In a line of cases reaching its nadir in Coleman v. Thompson,5 the
Supreme Court has refused.6 More recently in Martinez v. Ryan,7 a 2012
non-capital case, the Court declined to modify its constitutional views. 8
But it ruled for the prisoner, in an opinion that Justice Antonin Scalia
described in dissent as having "essentially the same practical
consequences as a holding that collateral-review counsel is
constitutionally required" in capital and non-capital cases alike.9 Justice
Scalia may well be right, at least to the extent that the states will decide
that their only reasonable choice is to provide effective counsel for every
indigent capital petitioner pursuing state post-conviction relief But if so,
this welcome development will result not just from the pressure that the
states experience from the defendant's victory in Martinez but also from
the converging pressure ° created by the state's victory the previous year
in Cullen v. Pinholster.'
In combination, "[t]he confluence of pressures now centered on
state post-conviction proceedings could yield genuine benefits to the
entire criminal justice system and all of its stakeholders."11 Read
together the two decisions encourage "the state and national
governments [to] each discharge their duties responsibly," with the result
that "the federal system will be working as it should: efficiency will be
furthered while at the same time 'a double security arises to the rights of
the people.""' 2
II. MARTINEZ: PROCEDURAL AND SUBSTANTIVE IMPLICATIONS
The defendant's legal argument in Martinez was straightforward.
The state unquestionably had the duty to provide him with the effective
assistance of counsel at trial. 13 But if under state law he could assert a
5. 501 U.S. 722 (1991).
6. See id.at 756-57; Murray v. Giarratano, 492 U.S. 1, 12-13 (1989). The Guidelines
encourage counsel to challenge this position. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 1.1
cmt., at 932 n.47, Guideline 10.15.1 cmt., at 1081 n.333.
7. 132 S.Ct. 1309 (2012).
8. Id. at 1319-20.
9. Id. at 1322
10. 131 S. Ct. 1388, 1398 (2011).
11. Eric M. Freedman, State Post-Conviction Remedies in the Next Fifteen Years: How
Synergy Between the State and Federal Governments Can Improve the Criminal Justice System

Nationally, 24 FED. SENT'G REP. 298, 299 (2012) [hereinafter Freedman, State Post-Conviction
Remedies].

12.

Id. (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 51, at 295 (James Madison) (Am. Bar Ass'n 2009)

(1788)).

13. See Martinez, 132 S.Ct. at 1313-14 (majority opinion) (stating that on "federal habeas
review ...petitioner sought to argue he had received ineffective assistance of counsel at
trial ....
");Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339-40 (1963) (holding that "in federal courts
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claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel only in post-conviction
proceedings, and if he had no right to the effective assistance of counsel
to bring that claim in those proceedings, then the state could effectively
nullify its duty both practically, by failing to provide a lawyer to litigate
the claim properly, and legally, by triggering a procedural default that
would preclude federal habeas review of the claim. 14 In response, the
Martinez Court eschewed recognition of a constitutional right to the
effective assistance of counsel in state post-conviction proceedings but
instead held by a seven to two vote that, where state post-conviction is
the mandatory initial opportunity15 to raise a substantial claim of
ineffective assistance of trial counsel 16 and the federal habeas court
counsel must be provided for defendants unable to employ counsel unless the right is competently
and intelligently waived").
14. For this reason, the Court had explicitly carved out ineffective assistance of trial counsel
claims from its decision in Coleman v. Thompson, that there is no constitutional right to counsel on
state collateral review and the appropriate "allocation of costs" between the state and the petitioner
is to require "petitioner [to] bear the burden of a failure to follow state procedural rules," even if the
burden in question is that he is executed with potentially meritorious claims unreviewed by any state
or federal court. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 754-55 (1991); see Eric M. Freedman,
Habeas Corpus Cases Rewrote the Doctrine, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 19, 1991, at S6 (objecting that under
Coleman, where the capital petitioner forfeited all federal claims because state post-conviction
counsel filed papers three days late, "the system works only one way: A lawyer may default on
claims on behalf of a petitioner, but a petitioner may not attack the lawyer as ineffective for having
done so").
15. The Court subsequently clarified this element of the rule. See Trevino v. Thaler, 133
S. Ct. 1911, 1921 (2013) (holding that where the "state procedural framework, by reason of its
design and operation, makes it highly unlikely in a typical case that a defendant will have a
meaningful opportunity to raise a claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel on direct appeal,
our holding in Martinez applies").
16. In explicating this standard the Court wrote:
To overcome the default, a prisoner must also demonstrate that the underlying
ineffective-assistance-of-trial-counsel claim is a substantial one, which is to say that the
prisoner must demonstrate that the claim has some merit." Cf. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537
U.S. 322, 123 S.Ct. 1029, 154 L.Ed.2d 931 (2003) (describing standards for certificates
of appealability to issue).
Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1318-19.
This passage is of central importance because the Miller-El standard is whether "jurists
of reason could disagree with the district court's resolution of [the] constitutional claims or that
jurists could conclude the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed
further," rather than whether the court believes that the petitioner will ultimately "demonstrate an
entitlement to relief." Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 337 (2003). The rationale for the
Court's adoption of the standard was evidently that in the Martinez context, as in that of Miller-El,
the issue for decision is the threshold one of whether the petitioner will be allowed to litigate on the
merits.
Thus, a court applying Martinez must decide whether the underlying claim of trial
counsel ineffectiveness is fairly debatable among jurists of reason, rather than whether it is
meritorious under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984). See Barnett v. Roper, No.
4:03CV00614, 2013 WL 1721205, at *10 & n. 16 (E.D. Mo. Apr. 22, 2013); see also Sheppard v.
Robinson, No. 1:00-CV-493, 2013 WL 146342, at *13 (S.D. Oh. Jan. 14, 2013), certificate of
appealabilitygrantedon other grounds, No. 1:00-CV-493, 2013 WL 1346138 (Apr. 2, 2013). If
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would otherwise be unable to reach that claim because of a procedural
default during state post-conviction proceedings, the federal habeas
court may exercise its equitable discretion to forgive the procedural
default if the state failed to appoint effective (or any) post-conviction
counsel for the prisoner.17
As Justice Scalia accurately pointed out in dissent, the logical
boundaries of this decision are fuzzy. 18 On the procedural front, there
seems no apparent reason why the ruling should be limited to situations
in which the ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel causes the claim
of ineffectiveness of trial counsel to be defaulted in federal court.
Suppose instead that the claim is barred there because of counsel's
failure to meet the statute of limitations for the filing of a federal habeas
petition. 9 The Court has already held that statute to be subject to
equitable tolling, and has specifically ruled that abandonment by one's
state post-conviction attorney is a circumstance causing a federal court
to exercise its equitable discretion in a petitioner's favor.2 ° Surely the
the rule were otherwise, Martinez would-contrary to the views of all nine Justices-have not
changed the pre-existing law in a way having real-world significance. As noted infra text
accompanying note 27, to adjudicate the ultimate claim on the very record being attacked as having
been flawed by the incompetence of post-conviction counsel would be to "palter with us in a
double sense; ... keep the word of promise to our ear, [a]nd break it to our hope." WILLIAM
SHAKESPEARE, THE TRAGEDY OF MACBETH act 5, sc. 8; see Mann v. Moore, No. 13-11322-P, slip
op. at 19-20 (11 th Cir. Apr. 9, 2013) (Martin, J., dissenting).
17. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317-18. The Association of the Bar of the City of New York
proposed substantially this rule in a 1989 report of which I was the principal drafter. See Comm. on
Civil Rights, Legislative Modification of FederalHabeas Corpus in CapitalCases, 44 REC. OF THE
ASS'N OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF N.Y. 848, 854-55 (1989); Freedman, Fewer Risks, supra note 3,
at 189 (predicting that the City Bar's "suggestion[] that the ineffectiveness of post-conviction
counsel should preclude states in federal habeas proceedings from reliance upon procedural
defaults[] may well find judicial acceptance soon").
18. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1321 & n.1, (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that the Court
"insults the reader's intelligence" by suggesting that there is "a dime's worth of difference" between
the fact pattern before it and a number of others that might be covered by the ruling). Various
situations to which Martinez may apply are considered in Nancy J. King, Preview: A Preliminary
Survey oflssues Raised by Martinez v. Ryan 2-16 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch. Pub. Law & Legal
Theory, Working Paper No. 12-34), availableat http://ssm.com/abstract-2147164.
The statutory landscape of habeas corpus is currently dominated by the Antiterrorism and
Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, §§ 101-08, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217-26
[hereinafter AEDPA], whose results insofar as relevant to this Article are now codified in 28 U.S.C.
§§ 2241-55 (2006 & Supp. 1 2009) (containing statutes relevant to federal habeas corpus petitions).
See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 1.1 cmt., at 929 & n.34, 930, 936, Guideline 10.15.1
cmt., at 1083-87 (describing statutory changes in 1996, noting that federal habeas corpus
proceedings are "govemed by a complex set of procedural rules" that "[c]ounsel must
master.., thoroughly," and describing "The Labyrinth of Post-conviction Litigation").
19. Cf McQuiggin v. Perkins, 133 S. Ct. 1924, 1931-34 (2013) (holding that showing of
actual innocence, previously held to be effectual to overcome a procedural default, would also serve
as equitable exception overcoming a federal filing deadline).
20. See Maples v. Thomas, 132 S. Ct. 912, 927 (2012); Holland v. Florida, 130 S. Ct. 2549,
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ineffectiveness of state post-conviction counsel must be another,
particularly in circumstances where the petitioner has exercised due
diligence and the underlying claim is strong. Similarly, suppose the
ineffectiveness of post-conviction counsel causes the claim to come to
federal court unexhausted, a circumstance which, because the statute of
limitations has subsequently run, threatens to bar the claim forever. Even
before Martinez, there was very visible authority for the proposition that
the ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel in creating that
circumstance would excuse the failure to exhaust. On remand from
Rhines v. Weber,21 the District Court, whose ruling had been affirmed by
the Supreme Court, squarely held that ineffectiveness of state postconviction counsel constituted "good cause" for petitioner's failure to
exhaust, thereby entitling him to the benefits of the equitable stay and
abatement procedure the Court had just created.22 That result, correct
under Rhines, would be equally so under Martinez. So too, in light of the
policy-driven reading that the Court has given to the statutory
restrictions on "second or successive" habeas petitions-selfconsciously refusing to attribute a literal meaning to the language of 28
U.S.C. § 2244(b) 23-there may well be circumstances under which the
ineffectiveness of state post-conviction counsel should cause a federal
court to conclude that the second-in time petition before it is not "second
,,24
or successive.
Ineffective state post-conviction counsel might also "fail[] to
develop the factual basis of a claim" of trial counsel ineffectiveness,
with the result that 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(2) barred the federal habeas
court from considering the evidence.25 In that case, the federal court
should in equity consider the evidence that post-conviction counsel
2560 (2010); Adam Liptak, Lawyers Stumble, and Clients Take Fall, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 8, 2013, at
A12 (identifying "the larger question that runs through these cases: why is it morally permissible to
blame clients for their lawyers' mistakes?").
21. 544 U.S. 269 (2005).
22. Rhines v. Weber, 408 F. Supp. 2d 844, 846-47 (D.S.D. 2005). See Freedman, Fewer
Risks, supra note 3, at 187-89 (discussing the excuse for non-exhaustion adopted in Rhines).
23. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 943-47 (2007).
24. The Supreme Court has reached this conclusion not only in Panetti, but also in Slack v.
McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 485-89 (2000) (holding, "[a] habeas petition filed in the district court after
an initial habeas petition was unadjudicated on its merits and dismissed for failure to exhaust state
remedies is not a second or successive petition"); Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal, 523 U.S. 637, 64445 (1998) (refusing to count prematurely-asserted claim); see also, e.g., Phillips v. Seiter, 173 F.3d
609, 610-11 (7th Cir. 1999) (involving earlier application filed in wrong district dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction); Benton v. Washington, 106 F.3d 162, 164-65 (7th Cir. 1996) (involving earlier
application dismissed for failure to pay filing fee).
25. See Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 420, 432 (2000) (holding that "a failure to develop the
factual basis of a claim is not established unless there is lack of diligence, or some greater fault,
attributable to the prisoner or the prisoner's counsel").
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ought to have presented. Not only is it axiomatic that "[e]quity looks
upon that as done that ought to have been done,"2 6 but, more practically,
Martinez will do nothing to help the federal habeas petitioner if the
District Court considers his underlying claim of trial court
ineffectiveness on the very record that he asserts was flawed by the
ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel.27
On the substantive front, the equitable rationale of Martinez should
apply to a number of claims other than ineffective assistance of trial
counsel.28 The state's duty to provide effective assistance is, of course,
well established and fundamental to justice." But there are other
trial rights in that category, which by their very nature can only be
effectively enforced in post-conviction proceedings.30 Consider, for
example, situations involving the prosecution's failure to disclose
exculpatory evidence 3 ' or deals with witnesses,32 its use of perjured
testimony, 33 or its suppression of evidence by the use of threats.3 4 Is it
equitable for a state to be able to evade federal review of such claims by
contriving that the petitioner never has effective counsel to pursue them?
These and other open questions surrounding Martinez might
certainly encourage a state that did not previously provide effective postconviction counsel to do so, at least in capital cases, as a safeguard
against having convictions overturned on federal habeas corpus review.35
26. See 3 ROSCOE POUND, JURISPRUDENCE 553 (1959) (internal quotation marks omitted)
(describing history of maxim).
27. See Mann v. Moore, No. 13-11322-P, slip op. at 19-20 (11 th Cir. Apr. 9, 2013) (Martin,
J., dissenting).
28. This assertion finds support both in legal logic and in the Court's explicit statement of the
importance of the ongoing application of the equitable principles traditionally guiding habeas
corpus, see Eric M. Freedman, Habeas Corpus as a Common Law Writ, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REv. 591, 607 n.85 (2011), to the habeas regime created by AEDPA. See Holland v. Florida, 130
S. Ct. 2549, 2560-61 (2010).
29. See Martinez, 132 S. Ct. at 1317 (majority opinion).
30. There are also situations in which the right (e.g., not to be executed if mentally retarded)
might be vindicated as part of the trial or in some sort of collateral proceeding, depending on how
the state chooses to arrange its criminal justice system. In such situations the state should-as a
constitutional, not an equitable, matter-be held to the standard that would apply at a criminal trial
regardless of how the proceedings are organized. See Hooks v. Workman, 689 F.3d 1148, 1183-85
(10th Cir. 2012) (holding that capital petitioner was constitutionally entitled to effective assistance
of counsel at mental retardation hearing notwithstanding that state conducted it post-conviction).
31. SeeBradyv. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83, 87 (1963).
32. See Giglio v. United States, 405 U.S. 150, 152, 154-55 (1972).
33. SeeMooneyv. Holohan, 294 U.S. 103, 110 (1935).
34. See Pyle v. Kansas, 317 U.S. 213,214, 216 (1942).
35. Most death penalty states already provide counsel in capital cases, although the
requirements for-and realities of-effective performance vary widely. See Maples v. Thomas, 132
S. Ct. 912, 918 (2012) (reporting that Alabama is "[n]early alone" in failing to provide counsel to
indigent defendants in capital cases); ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 2.1 & cmt., at 939,
941 (requiring that states create a plan for conforming to Guidelines and observing that "[t]he
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But that would not be the only consideration bearing upon the decision.
Surveying the current legal terrain, a state would appropriately take into
consideration not just the threat of loss represented by Martinez but also
the hope of gain offered by Pinholster.
III. P1NHOLSTER: DUE PROCESS AS THE PRICE OF DEFERENCE
Nothing in the federal Constitution requires the states to provide for
post-conviction proceedings in criminal cases. But they have long done
so, with two salient legal consequences:
1. State post-conviction systems must provide due process. As the
Court has recently reiterated, their failure to do so is subject to attack
under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.36
2. Where a state post-conviction system exists, a state prisoner must
invoke it as a pre-condition to the grant of federal habeas relief unless
it
37
is unavailable or "ineffective to protect the rights of the applicant.
AEDPA contains various limitations on the courts' authority to
grant the writ to state prisoners, including the provision of 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d)(1) that "with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the
merits in State court proceedings" 38 the writ shall not be granted unless
critical element is that the plan be judicially enforceable in full against the jurisdiction"); Freedman,
Giarratano Is a Scarecrow, supra note 4, at 1086-88 (noting that only fourteen states recognize a
state statutory or constitutional right to effective counsel at post-conviction proceedings and that
there are a "disturbingly large number of instances" in which counsel, when appointed, is
ineffective). As Professor Ty Alper points out, the pressure that Martinez puts on the state is less in
noncapital cases than in capital ones. See Ty Alper, Towards a Right to Litigate Ineffective
Assistance of Counsel, 70 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 842, 874-76 (2013) (noting that Martinez applies
only when a state prisoner files a federal habeas petition alleging ineffectiveness of counsel and that
noncapital defendants typically have no habeas counsel in federal court). Cf Collazo v. Curley, No.
11-6, 2012 WL 2026830, at *5-6 (W.D.Pa. June 5, 2012) (appointing counsel for a non-capital
habeas petitioner to pursue a Martinez issue).
36. See Skinner v. Switzer, 131 S.Ct. 1289, 1296, 1298 (2011); Dist. Att'y's Office for Third
Judicial Dist. v. Osborne, 557 U.S. 52, 70, 73-75 (2009).
37. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b)(1) (2006); cf Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 954 (2007)
(refusing to defer to state courts' factual finding that petitioner was mentally competent because
their fact-finding process was inadequate); Freedman, Fewer Risks, supranote 3, at 189 (observing
that a state post-conviction system that "cannot be effectually employed without the aid of a
competent attorney" should meet § 2254(b)(l)'s description).
38. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). If this pre-condition does not apply, neither does the remainder of
the section. See Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388, 1398-99, 1401 (2011); Porter v. McCollum,
558 U.S. 30, 39 (2009) (per curiam) ("Because the state court did not decide whether [petitioner's]
counsel was deficient, we review this element of [petitioner's] Strickland claim de novo."); Cone v.
Bell, 556 U.S. 449, 472 (2009) ("Because the Tennessee courts did not reach the merits of Cone's
Brady claim, federal habeas review is not subject to the deferential standard ...[and instead], the
claim is reviewed de novo."); Rompilla v. Beard, 545 U.S. 374, 390 (2005) ("Because the state
courts found the representation adequate, they never reached the issue of prejudice ... and so we
examine this element of the Strickland claim de novo.") (citations omitted) (citing Wiggins v.
Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 534 (2003)).
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that adjudication "resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved
an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as
determined by the Supreme Court of the United States."3 9 Construing
this provision as a threshold barrier to fact-finding by the District Court,
Pinholster held that in determining whether petitioner has met the
standard the federal habeas court must confine itself at the outset to a
consideration of the record that the state courts had before them.4
In performing this task, the District Court is ordinarily to presume
the truth of the facts found by the state courts, as 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1)
requires. 4' To the extent that the state courts have not made factual
determinations but instead summarily dismissed a claim, the federal
court must accept the movant's factual allegations in the state court
petition as true-just as the state courts were required to do under basic
due process norms. 42
Even where the state courts have found facts, however, the
presumption of correctness has a critical exception for situations where
the petitioner has not been given a full and fair opportunity to develop
his claim in the state post-conviction proceedings that are to form the
basis for the federal court's determination.4 3 Scott Lynn Pinholster did
not invoke this exception." Had he done so and succeeded, the Court
would have ordered the District Court to determine the facts de novo.
The stated basis for that order would most likely have been a
construction of AEDPA 45-one that the Court would have been strongly
driven to adopt by its powerful rule of reading statutes to avoid a serious
39. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).
40. See Pinholster,131 S.Ct. at 1398.
41. The next paragraph of text parses the "ordinarily."
42. See Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. at 1402 n.12; Herman v. Claudy, 350 U.S. 116, 123 (1956)
(reversing state Supreme Court for summarily denying habeas petition on merits simply based on
respondent's denial and without providing evidentiary hearing). Thus, where there has been no factfinding in state court, the question on federal habeas becomes whether, assuming the truth of all of
the facts the petitioner proffered to the state courts, those courts' legal determination that the
petitioner failed to state a claim for relief was "contrary to" or involved an "unreasonable
application of' clearly established federal law. See Morris v. Thaler, 425 Fed. App'x 415, 418, 420
(5th Cir. 2011) (reversing District Court for failing to grant petitioner's allegations required
presumption of truth).
43. See 1 RANDY HERTZ & JAMES S. LIEBMAN, FEDERAL HABEAS CORPUS PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 7.1[b] (6th ed. 2011). There is an exhaustive discussion describing the effects of
deficient state post-conviction processes on federal habeas corpus adjudication as well as an
extended argument that the states are constitutionally required to provide competent post-conviction
counsel in capital cases, in id. at ch. 7.
44. On the contrary, his position was that the record compiled in state court fully supported
his position. See Pinholster, 131 S. Ct. at 1402 n. 11.
45. The details have been lucidly set forth in Justin F. Marceau, Don't ForgetDue Process:
The Path Not (Yet) Taken in § 2254 Habeas Corpus Adjudications, 62 HASTINGS L.J. 1, 57-64
(2011).
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constitutional question.46 Here, the rub is that it would be
unconstitutional to deny a state prisoner one full and fair opportunity to
demonstrate the federal invalidity of his conviction. 47 "Due process
forbids the substantive deference announced in § 2254 where a prisoner
has not received a full and
fair review of his constitutional claims, either
48
in state or federal court."
IV. CONCLUSION: FEDERALISM AS A PROTECTOR OF LIBERTY

In refusing to hold that the Constitution required the states to
provide counsel to state post-conviction petitioners, the Supreme Court
began its Coleman opinion with the noxious sentence: "This is a case
about federalism., 49 Federalism, Justice Harold Blackmun correctly
retorted, "has no inherent normative value" but rather is a device that
46. See, e.g., Immigration & Naturalization Serv. v. St. Cyr, 533 U.S. 289, 299-301 (2001)
(construing statute to permit habeas relief, thereby avoiding substantial constitutional question
under Suspension Clause); United States v. X-Citement Video, Inc., 513 U.S. 64, 68-69 (1994)
(applying rule that a statute is to be construed where fairly possible so as to avoid substantial
constitutional questions since "[wie do not assume that Congress, in passing laws, intended [arguably
unconstitutional] results"); Pub. Citizen v. United States Dep't of Justice, 491 U.S. 440, 465-67 (1989)
(applying rule as decisive consideration where other interpretive factors resulted in a close question);
Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council, 485 U.S. 568, 575
(1988) (noting that "where an otherwise acceptable construction of a statute would raise serious
constitutional problems, the Court will construe the statute to avoid such problems unless such
construction is plainly contrary to the intent of Congress.... This cardinal principle has its roots in
Chief Justice Marshall's [1804] opinion for the Court in Murray v. The Charming Betsy... and has for
so long been applied by this Court that it is beyond debate") (citations omitted) (citing Murray v.
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. 64, 118 (1804)); United States ex rel. Att'y Gen. v. Del. & Hudson
Co., 213 U.S. 366, 408 (1909) (stating that "where a statute is susceptible of two constructions, by one
of which grave and doubtful constitutional questions arise and by the other of which such questions are
avoided, our duty is to adopt the latter"); Note, The Avoidance of Constitutional Questions and the
PreservationofJudicialReview: FederalCourt Treatment of the New Habeas Provisions, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 1578, 1585-87 (1998).
47. See Moore v. Dempsey, 261 U.S. 86, 92 (1923) (holding that state post-conviction
processes were not "sufficient to allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of examining
the facts for himself'). Petitioner's brief had explicitly sought to distinguish the seemingly adverse
precedent of Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309 (1915) by arguing that the state post-conviction
proceedings in Frankhad taken place before a dispassionate tribunal that had the authority to find
the facts, while in Moore the facts were determined on a motion for a new trial by the very judge
whose conduct was in question and whose decision could only be reviewed for legal error. Moore,
261 U.S. at 90-92; see ERIC M. FREEDMAN, HABEAS CORPUS: RETHINKING THE GREAT WRIT OF
LIBERTY 80-81 (2001) (discussing Moore and Frank).
48. Marceau, supra note 45, at 7. For a convincing argument under the Suspension Clause
coming to the same conclusion see Samuel R. Wiseman, Habeas After Pinholster, 53 B.C. LREv.
953,992-99 (2012).
49. Coleman v. Thompson, 501 U.S. 722, 726 (1991); see Eric M. Freedman, FederalHabeas
Corpus in CapitalCases, in AMERICA'S EXPERIMENT WITH CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: REFLECTIONS
ON THE PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE ULTIMATE PENAL SANCTION 553,567 (James R. Acker
et al. eds., 2d ed. 2003) (calling this statement "a dictum that will live in infamy").
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"secures to citizens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of
sovereign power., 50 To take maximum advantage
of that device,
51
"[a]mbition must be made to counteract ambition.,
In the aftermath of Martinez and Pinholster, both the state and
federal governments have strong self-interests in strengthening state
post-conviction systems, specifically through the appointment of
effective counsel for capital petitioners. If the states create robust
processes for post-conviction review, the federal courts will under
Pinholster treat their individual outcomes with greater respect than
before. But if the states fail to do so, they are now vulnerable not only to
structural assaults for failing to provide due process 5 2 but also to casespecific challenges based on the equitable rule of Martinez. Providing
competent counsel in state post-conviction proceedings, in capital cases
first of all, is an easy way for the states to push back on both fronts.
Because the law regarding effective assistance of counsel is
distinctly government-friendly,53 this reform is likely under current
conditions to insulate most state post-conviction systems from
successful structural attacks, while any attempt by the states to meet
their due process obligation without providing lawyers seems
increasingly unlikely to succeed. 54 "It is easy to see how a state might
provide lawyers and still maintain an unfair post-conviction system (e.g.,
by denying discovery), but it is hard to see how a state might maintain a
fair post-conviction system and not provide lawyers. 55
But even if the states fend off systemic lawsuits, each individual
petitioner who was not given an effective post-conviction counsel will
still be able to mount a Martinez attack. Even on a reasonably
narrow
56
reading of the case many such claims will be meritorious.
50.

Coleman, 501 U.S. at 759 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).

51.

THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison), supra note 12, at 294.

52. See Justin F. Marceau, Challenging the Habeas Process Rather Than the Result, 69
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 85, 92 (2012); supra text accompanying note 36.

53. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 1.1 cmt., at 930 (observing that, "[u]nder
the standards set out by the Supreme Court for reviewing claims of ineffective assistance of counsel,
even seriously deficient performance all too rarely leads to reversal") (footnote omitted).
54. The states' situation in this respect was already vulnerable even before the most recent
cases. See Freedman, FewerRisks, supra note 3, at 190.
55. Freedman, State Post-ConvictionRemedies, supranote 11, at 299.
56. For example, in Gallow v. Cooper, No. 12-7516, 2013 WL 3213609, at *1 (U.S. June 27,
2013) (respecting denial of petition for certiorari) Justices Stephen Breyer and Sonia Sotomayor
observed that "[a] claim without any evidence to support it might as well be no claim at all."
Therefore, they continued, if state post-conviction counsel's ineffectiveness in failing to produce
evidence of trial counsel's ineffectiveness led to an adverse finding of fact in state court (rather than
a default), there exists "a strong argument" that Martinez should apply to preclude application of
Pinholster.Id
A similarly forceful argument could be made with respect to the substantive claims
canvassed, supratext accompanying notes 31-34, and an even more forceful one in the specifically
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The interests of the federal government, for its part, lie in the
direction of insisting that the states provide fully effective systems of
post-conviction review.5 7 Because a state is not entitled to benefit in
federal court from prior proceedings that fall below constitutional
minima,58 a federal court cannot rely upon such proceedings and
therefore must do the work itself.59 For example, while a federal court
may in many circumstances rely upon the results of a fairly conducted
state evidentiary hearing, it must find the facts for itself if a hearing that
should have been held was not.6 ° Similarly, the less legal analysis a state
post-conviction court does, the more a federal habeas court must do.61
Moreover, there is an inverse relationship between the states' costs
in providing post-conviction counsel and the federal government's costs
in providing counsel for federal habeas corpus proceedings. 62 Federal
law provides for the appointment of qualified counsel in habeas corpus
proceedings that challenge state capital convictions.63 Under the
Guidelines, one of such counsel's key duties is to recognize and attempt
to overcome any procedural blunders committed by state post-conviction
attorneys-a duty whose competent discharge involves significant
expense. 64 If appointed federal habeas counsel fails to do this job
effectively, a petitioner may be able to assert rights flowing from the
federal statutory mandate for qualified federal habeas counsel, 65 even
capital context of a claim of incompetency to be executed under Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399
(1986). Not only is that claim deeply rooted in traditional common law equitable notions, see id. at
406-09, but the Court has made quite clear that state procedures for its adjudication will receive
close scrutiny. See Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 948-54 (2007) (giving no deference to a
finding of Ford competency that state courts reached by a process inadequate for reaching
reasonably correct results).
57. See Case v. Nebraska, 381 U.S. 336, 345-46 (1965) (Brennan, J.,concurring) (per
curiam).
58. See, e.g., Johnson v. Mississippi, 486 U.S. 578, 584-86 (1988) (holding the state is not
entitled to rely in capital sentencing on conviction that had been vacated for failure to provide
defendant with counsel).
59. See supra text accompanying notes 47-48.
60. See supratext accompanying note 48.
61. See ABA GUIDELINES, supra note 1, Guideline 1.1 cmt., at 929-30; see also supra note
38.
62. The remainder of this paragraph is drawn from Freedman, Fewer Risks, supra note 3, at
190-91.
63. See 21 U.S.C. § 848(q)(4)(B) (2000); see also McFarland v. Scott, 512 U.S. 849, 859
(1994) (noting the importance of this entitlement for "promoting fundamental fairness in the
imposition of the death penalty").
64. See Eric M. Freedman, The Revised ABA Guidelines and the Duties of Lawyers and
Judges in Capital Post-Conviction Proceedings, 5 J.APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 325, 341-43 (2003)
(discussing ABA GUIDELINE 10.7).
65. See Cooey v. Bradshaw, 216 F.R.D. 408, 415-17 (N.D. Ohio 2003) (granting stay of
execution on claim of ineffective assistance by prior counsel appointed under 21 U.S.C § 848),
motion to vacate stay denied, 338 F.3d 615, 616 (6th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 539 U.S. 974 (2003).
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though he could not predicate a habeas corpus claim directly on the
ineffective assistance of state post-conviction counsel.6 6 Thus, whether
appointed federal habeas counsel performs well or badly in cleaning up
the mess left behind by ineffective lawyers in state capital postconviction proceedings, the federal government bears significant
costs caused by the states' failure to provide competent counsel in the
first place.
The longstanding policy of the ABA has been to take no position on
the desirability of the death penalty, provided that it is not inflicted on
mentally retarded persons, juveniles, or those not represented throughout
the process in accordance with its Guidelines.6 7 The ABA has already
achieved the first two of these goals through Supreme Court decisions.68
If lawyers and judges make appropriate use of Martinez and Pinholster,
ten years from now we may be able to say the same about the third.

Richard Cooey was executed on October 14, 2008. See Tom Beyerlein, Ohio Executes Coeds'
Killer, DAYTON DAILY NEWS,Oct. 15, 2008, at Al.
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(i) (2006) ("The ineffectiveness or incompetence of counsel during
Federal or State collateral post-conviction proceedings shall not be a ground for relief in a
proceeding arising under § 2254.").
67. See
Death
Penalty
Moratorium
Implementation
Project,
ABA,
http://www.americanbar.org/groups/individual-rights/projects/deathjpenalty moratoriumimpleme
ntation_project/policy.html (last visited July 18, 2013) (containing ABA resolution of Feb. 3, 1997
embodying this position, with links to relevant policies).
68. See Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 574-75 (2005), overruling Stanford v. Kentucky,
492 U.S. 361 (1989) (barring imposition of death penalty on juveniles); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S.
304, 321 (2002), overruling Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302 (1989) (barring imposition of death
penalty on mentally retarded persons). The ABA believes that the logic of these two cases requires
that an exemption from capital punishment also be extended to certain classes of mentally ill
offenders.

See ABA

SECTION

OF INDIVIDUAL

RIGHTS

AND

RESPONSIBILITIES

ET

AL.,

RECOMMENDATION 122A, at 7-9 (2006), available at http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/documents/
122AReport.pdf (exempting those with severe mental illness from the death penalty).
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